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Abstract
We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict
which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pair-
wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G
to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse oﬀ or equally well
oﬀ, (ii) if there exists a farsightedly improving path from any network outside the set
leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying
(i) and (ii). We show that a non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists
and we provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of
networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a
Pareto dominating network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study
the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the
largest consistent set.
JEL classification: A14, C70, D20.
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1 Introduction
The organization of individual agents into networks and groups or coalitions plays an im-
portant role in the determination of the outcome of many social and economic interactions.
For instance, networks of personal contacts are important in obtaining information about
job opportunities. Goods can be traded and exchanged through networks of buyers and
sellers. The partitioning of societies into groups is also important in many contexts, such
as the provision of public goods and the formation of alliances, cartels and federations.1
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run
is to examine the requirement that individuals do not benefit from altering the structure
of the network. A weak version of such a condition is the pairwise stability notion defined
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). There are alternative ways to model network stability.
One is to explicitly model a game by which links form and then to solve that game
using the concept of Nash equilibrium or one of its refinements. Aumann and Myerson
(1988) take such an approach in the context of communication games, where individuals
sequentially propose links. However, such an approach has the disadvantage that the game
is necessarily ad hoc and is quite sensitive to the exact network formation process.
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) analyze a link formation game where individuals simul-
taneously choose all the links they wish to be involved in. But this approach is static and
myopic. Individuals cannot be forward-looking in the sense that they do not forecast how
others might react to their actions. For instance, individuals might not add a link that
appears valuable to them given the current network, as that might in turn lead to the
formation of other links and ultimately lower the payoﬀs of the original individuals.
A dynamic (but still myopic) network formation process has been recently studied by
Jackson and Watts (2002), who have proposed a dynamic process in which individuals
form and sever links based on the improvement that the resulting network oﬀers them
relative to the current network. This deterministic dynamic process may end at stable
networks or in some cases may cycle.2
We propose a new concept, pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which
networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairwise far-
sightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G are deterred
by the threat of ending worse oﬀ or equally well oﬀ, (ii) if there exists a farsightedly im-
proving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii)
if there is no proper subset of G satisfying (i) and (ii). In contrast to other concepts incor-
1Jackson (2003, 2005) provides surveys of models of network formation.
2Watts (2001) has extended the Jackson and Wolinsky model to a dynamic process but she has limited
attention to the context of the connections model and a particular deterministic dynamic.
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porating farsightedness, we propose a set-valued concept which not only requests that all
possible pairwise deviations out of the set are deterred by the threat of ending worse oﬀ,
but also that the networks within the set are robust to perturbations. Unintended changes
may be due to exogenous forces acting on the network, or simply miscalculations or errors
on the part of an individual making an assessment or taking an action. Robustness to
perturbations asks for the existence of a farsightedly improving path from any network
outside the set leading to some network in the set.3
A farsightedly improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players
form or sever links based on the improvement the end network oﬀers relative to the current
network. Each network in the sequence diﬀers by one link from the previous one. If a link
is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the end network to the current
network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is
deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the link strictly
prefers the end network. We show that a pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists and
we provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks.
As a corollary, we give the necessary and suﬃcient condition such that a unique pairwise
farsightedly stable set consisting of a single network exists.
We also look at the relationship between farsighted stability and eﬃciency of net-
works. We find that the pairwise farsightedly stable sets and the set of strongly eﬃcient
networks, those which are socially optimal, may be disjoint. We provide conditions on the
allocation rule and the value function such that pairwise farsighted stability singles out
the strongly eﬃcient network. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, if there is a network
that Pareto dominates all other networks, then that network is the unique prediction of
pairwise farsighted stability.
Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsightedly stability and other
concepts such as the pairwise largest consistent set, a notion due to Chwe (1994). By
means of examples we show that there is no relationship between (i) pairwise farsightedly
stable sets and pairwise largest consistent sets, (ii) pairwise farsightedly stable sets and
pairwise stability. Indeed, the pairwise stable networks may not belong to any pairwise
farsightedly stable set of networks.
Although the literature on stability in networks is well established and growing (see
Jackson, 2005), the literature on farsighted stability is still in its infancy. Page, Wooders
and Kamat (2005) have addressed the issue of farsighted stability in network formation
3Jackson and Watts (2002) use improving paths as the foundation for a stochastic analysis, where in
addition to intended changes in the network, unintended mutations or errors are introduced. However, in
their definition of improving path it is assumed that players behave myopically: all a player needs to know
is whether adding or deleting a given link is directly beneficial to him or her in the current circumstances.
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by extending Chwe’s (1994) result on the nonemptiness of farsightedly consistent sets. In
order to demonstrate the existence of farsightedly consistent directed networks, they have
provided a new framework that extends the standard notion of a directed network and
also introduces the notion of a supernetwork. A supernetwork specifies how the diﬀerent
directed networks are connected via coalitional moves and coalitional preferences, and thus
provides a network representation of agent preferences and the rules governing network
formation (that is, a supernetwork is equivalent to the social environment studied by
Chwe (1994), where the set of outcomes is replaced by the set of directed networks).
Given the rules governing network formation and agents preferences as represented via
the supernetwork, a directed network (i.e., a particular node in the supernetwork) is
said to be farsightedly consistent if no agent or coalition of agents is willing to alter
the network (via the addition, subtraction, or replacement of arcs) in fear that such an
alteration might induce further network alterations by other agents or coalitions that in
the end leave the initially deviating agent or coalition no better oﬀ, and possibly worse
oﬀ. They have shown that for any supernetwork corresponding to a given collection of
directed networks, the set of farsightedly consistent networks is nonempty; see also Page
and Wooders (2005). Dutta, Ghosal and Ray (2005) have studied a model of dynamic
network formation where individuals are farsighted and evaluate the desirability of a move
in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoﬀs. Only special
coalitions are active at any date. They have shown that a Markovian equilibrium process
of network formation exists and that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium
strategy profile yields paths that are absorbed solely into a set of eﬃcient networks. This
can be viewed as the dynamic counterpart of the conflict between (static) stability and
eﬃciency demonstrated by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). They provide two conditions on
the valuation structure that guarantee that there is some equilibrium profile at which the
complete graph is reached in the limit from all initial networks.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and basic
properties and definitions for networks. In Section 3 we define the notion of pairwise
farsightedly stable set of networks and we study its properties. In Section 4 we look
at the relationship between farsighted stability and eﬃciency of networks. In Section 5
we analyze the relationship between pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks and the
pairwise largest consistent set. In Section 5 we conclude.
4Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the work of Xue (1998),
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004), and Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004).
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2 Networks
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the finite set of players who are connected in some network rela-
tionship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus modeled as a
non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links indicate bilateral
relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which pairs of
individuals are linked to each other. We write ij ∈ g to indicate that i and j are linked
under the network g. Let gN be the collection of all subsets of N with cardinality 2, so gN
is the complete network. The set of all possible networks or graphs on N is denoted by G.
The set G is the collection of all subsets of gN . The network obtained by adding link ij to
an existing network g is denoted g+ ij and the network that results from deleting link ij
from an existing network g is denoted g− ij. For any network g, let N(g) = {i | there is j
such that ij ∈ g} be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g. A
path in a network g ∈ G between i and j is a sequence of players i1, ..., iK such that
ikik+1 ∈ g for each k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1} with i1 = 1 and iK = j. A nonempty network h ⊆ g
is a component of g, if for all i ∈ N(h) and j ∈ N(h), i 6= j, there exists a path in h
connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N(h) and j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies ij ∈ h. The set of
components of g is denoted by C(g).5
A value function is a function v : G→ R that keeps track of how the total societal value
varies across diﬀerent networks. The set of all possible value functions is denoted V. An
allocation rule is a function Y : G×V → RN that keeps track of how the value is allocated
or distributed among the players forming a network, and satisfies
P
i∈N Yi(g, v) = v(g) for
all v and g.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have proposed basic properties of value and allocation
functions. A value function is component additive if v(g) =
P
h∈C(g) v(h) for all g ∈ G.
Component additive value functions are the ones for which the value of a network is the
sum of the value of its components. An allocation rule Y is component balanced if for
any component additive v ∈ V, g ∈ G, and h ∈ C(g), we have Pi∈N(h) Yi(h, v) = v(h).
Component balancedness only puts conditions on Y for v’s that are component additive,
so Y can be arbitrary otherwise. Given a permutation of players π and any g ∈ G, let
gπ = {π(i)π(j) | ij ∈ g}. Thus, gπ is a network that is identical to g up to a permutation
of the players. A value function is anonymous if for any permutation π and any g ∈ G,
v(gπ) = v(g). Given a permutation π, let vπ be defined by vπ(g) = v(gπ−1) for each g ∈ G.
An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v ∈ V, g ∈ G, and permutation π, we have
5Throughout the paper we use the notation ⊆ for weak inclusion and Ã for strict inclusion. Finally, #
will refer to the notion of cardinality.
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Yπ(i)(gπ, vπ) = Yi(g, v).6
An allocation rule that is component balanced and anonymous is the componentwise
egalitarian allocation rule. For a component additive v and network g, the componentwise
egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is such that for any h ∈ C(g) and each i ∈ N(h), Y cei (g, v) =
v(h)/#N(h). For a v that is not component additive, Y ce(g, v) = v(g)/n for all g; thus,
Y ce splits the value v(g) equally among all players if v is not component additive.
In evaluating societal welfare, we may take various perspectives. A network g is Pareto
eﬃcient relative to v and Y if there does not exist any g0 ∈ G such that Yi(g0, v) ≥ Yi(g, v)
for all i with at least one strict inequality. A network g ∈ G is strongly eﬃcient relative
to v if v(g) ≥ v(g0) for all g0 ∈ G. This is a strong notion of eﬃciency as it takes the
perspective that value is fully transferable.
The network-theoretic literature uses two diﬀerent notions of a deviation by a coalition.
Pairwise deviations (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) are deviations involving a single link at
a time. Moreover, link addition is bilateral (two players that would be involved in the link
must agree to adding the link), link deletion is unilateral (at least one player involved in
the link must agree to delete the link), and network changes take place one link at a time.
Coalitionwise deviations (Jackson and van den Nouweland, 2005) are deviations involving
several links and some group of players at a time. Link addition is bilateral, link deletion
is unilateral, and multiple link changes can take place at a time. Whether a pairwise
deviation or a coalitionwise deviation makes more sense will depend on the setting within
which network formation takes place.
We will restrict our analysis to pairwise deviations. A simple way to analyze the
networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine the requirement
that agents do not benefit from altering the structure of the network. A weak version of
such a condition is the pairwise stability notion defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
A network is pairwise stable if no player benefits from severing one of their links and no
other two players benefit from adding a link between them, with one benefiting strictly
and the other at least weakly.
Definition 1 A network g is pairwise stable with respect to value function v and allocation
rule Y if
(i) for all ij ∈ g, Yi(g, v) ≥ Yi(g − ij, v) and Yj(g, v) ≥ Yj(g − ij, v), and
(ii) for all ij /∈ g, if Yi(g, v) < Yi(g + ij, v) then Yj(g, v) > Yj(g + ij, v).
6Anonymous value functions are those such that the architecture of a network matters, but not the
labels of individuals. Anonymity of an allocation rule requires that if all that has changed is the labels of
the agents and the value generated by networks has changed in an exactly corresponding fashion, then the
allocation only changes according to the relabeling.
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We say that g0 is adjacent to g if g0 = g + ij or g0 = g − ij for some ij. A network
g0 defeats g if either g0 = g − ij and Yi(g0, v) > Yi(g, v) or Yj(g0, v) > Yj(g, v), or if
g0 = g + ij with Yi(g0, v) ≥ Yi(g, v) and Yj(g0, v) ≥ Yj(g, v) with at least one inequality
holding strictly. Pairwise stability is equivalent to the statement of not being defeated by
another network.7
3 Pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks
The following example shows that a network that is pairwise stable need not be farsight-
edly stable.
Example 1 Criminal networks.8 Each player is a criminal. If two players are connected,
then they are part of the same criminal network. Each group of connected criminals has a
positive probability of winning the loot. The loot is divided among the connected criminals
based on the network architecture. Criminal i’s payoﬀ is given by
Yi(g) = pi(g) · (yi(g)− φ) + (1− pi(g)) · yi(g)
= yi(g)− pi(g) · φ,
where yi(g) is i’s expected share of the loot, pi(g) is i’s probability of being caught, φ > 0
the monetary equivalent of the penalty.9 Beside being competitors in the crime market,
criminals may also benefit from having criminal mates. It is assumed that (i) the bigger
the group of connected criminals, the higher its probability of getting the loot, and (ii)
the higher the number of links a criminal has, the lower his individual probability of being
caught. Let ni be the number of links criminal i has. Thus, it is assumed that pi(g) is
decreasing in ni. A criminal i that is part of a group S expects a share of the loot B given
7Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) have proposed a refinement of pairwise stability where coali-
tionwise deviations are allowed: the strongly stable networks. A strongly stable network is a network which
is stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. Strongly stable networks are Pareto eﬃ-
cient and maximize the overall value of the network if the value of each component of a network is allocated
equally among the members of that component.
8This is a simplified version of Calvó-Armengol and Zenou’s (2004) model where, in addition to forming
links with criminal mates, criminals choose their level of criminal activities and whether or not to be
involved in criminal activities.
9The value function v is simply v(g) =
P
i∈N Yi(g). Since v is fixed, we omit it in the notation of
Yi(v, g).
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by
yi(g) = |S|n · niP
j∈S
nj ·B, if |S| ≥ 2,
yi(g) = 1n ·B, if |S| = 1,
where |S| /n is the probability that group S will win the loot, and ni · [
P
j∈S nj ]−1 is
the share of the loot criminal i ∈ S would obtain.10 In Figure 1 we have depicted the
3−player case with B = 6 and pi(g) = (n−1−ni)/n. For φ < 32 , both the partial networks
(g1, g2, g3) and the complete network (g7) are pairwise stable networks. For φ ≥ 32 , the
complete network is the only pairwise stable network.
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Figure 1: Criminal networks.
Take some φ smaller than 3/2 in Example 1. Notice that two links have to be added
to a partial network g1, g2, or g3 to form the complete network g7. Farsighted players may
decide to add one link to a network like g1, g2, or g3, accepting a loss, in the expectation
that a further link will be added to form the complete network. Starting from the complete
network, farsighted players will decide not to delete a link in fear of eventually going back
to the partial network. A farsightedly improving path is a sequence of networks that can
emerge when players form or sever links based on the improvement the end network oﬀers
10This assumption captures the idea that delinquents learn from other criminals belonging to the same
network how to commit crime in a more eﬃcient way by sharing the know-how about the technology of
crime (see Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2004).
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relative to the current network.11 Each network in the sequence diﬀers by one link from
the previous one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the
end network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end
network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved
in the link strictly prefers the end network. We now introduce the formal definition of a
farsightedly improving path.
Definition 2 A farsightedly improving path from a network g to a network g0 is a finite
sequence of graphs g1, ..., gK with g1 = g and gK = g0 such that for any k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1}
either:
(i) gk+1 = gk − ij for some ij such that Yi(gK , v) > Yi(gk, v) or Yj(gK , v) > Yj(gk, v), or
(ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that Yi(gK , v) > Yi(gk, v) and Yj(gK , v) ≥ Yj(gk, v).
It follows immediately from the definition that the existence of a farsightedly improving
path from g to g0 implies g0 6= g.
If there exists a farsightedly improving path from g to g0, then we write g → g0. For
a given network g, let F (g) = {g0 ∈ G | g → g0}. This is the set of networks that can
be reached by a farsightedly improving path from g. Thus, g → g0 means that g0 is the
endpoint of at least one farsightedly improving path from g.
Suppose in Example 1 with φ smaller than 3/2 that the starting network g is a partial
network, more specifically, g = g1, g2, or g3. Then, from g no myopic improving path results
in the complete network. The problem is that an isolated player will loose from making a
link with any of the other players. However, there are farsightedly improving paths that
go to the complete network. An example of the sequence of graphs on the farsightedly
improving path is (g1, g4, g7) when starting in g1. Similar farsightedly improving paths
exist starting in any of the other partial networks. Examples of farsightedly improving
paths starting in g1 and ending in g7 are (g1, g4, g7), (g1, g5, g7), or even (g1, g0, g2, g6, g7).
Moreover, from any g 6= g7 there is a farsightedly improving path going to g7. Thus,
we observe that the partial networks are pairwise stable, but not stable when players are
farsighted. The complete network on the other hand is not only pairwise stable. It is also
stable when players are farsighted.
We now introduce the new concept, pairwise farsightedly stable sets. A set of networks
G is pairwise farsightedly stable if (i) all possible pairwise deviations from any network
11Jackson and Watts (2002) have provided a myopic definition of an improving path. A “myopic”
improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links based on the
improvement the resulting network oﬀers relative to the current network.
8
g ∈ G to a network outside G are deterred by a credible threat of ending worse oﬀ or
equally well oﬀ, (ii) there exists a farsightedly improving path from any network outside
the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) there is no proper subset of G satisfying
(i) and (ii) (minimality condition). Formally, pairwise farsightedly stable sets are defined
as follows.
Definition 3 A set of networks G ⊆ G is pairwise farsightedly stable with respect v and
Y if
(i) ∀ g ∈ G,
(ia) ∀ ij /∈ g such that g+ij /∈ G, ∃ g0 ∈ G∩F (g+ij) such that (Yi(g0, v), Yj(g0, v)) =
(Yi(g, v), Yj(g, v)) or Yi(g0, v) < Yi(g, v) or Yj(g0, v) < Yj(g, v),
(ib) ∀ ij ∈ g such that g−ij /∈ G, ∃ g0, g00 ∈ G∩F (g−ij) such that Yi(g0, v) ≤ Yi(g, v)
and Yj(g00, v) ≤ Yj(g, v),
(ii) ∀ g0 /∈ G we have g ∈ F (g0) for some g ∈ G,
(iii) @ G0 Ã G such that G0 satisfies (ia), (ib), and (ii).
Part (ia) in Definition 3 captures that adding a link ij to a network g ∈ G that
leads to a network outside of G, is deterred by the threat of ending in g0. Here g0 is such
that there is a farsightedly improving path from g + ij to g0. Moreover, g0 belongs to G,
which makes g0 a credible threat. Part (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for the
case where a link is severed. Part (ii) in Definition 3 requires that the networks within
the set are robust to perturbations. Robustness to perturbations asks for the existence
of a farsightedly improving path from any network outside G leading to some network in
G.12 Notice that the set G (trivially) satisfies (ia), (ib), and (ii) in Definition 3. This
motivates the requirement of a minimality condition, namely Part (iii). Part (ii) implies
that if a set of networks is pairwise farsightedly stable, it is non-empty.
Theorem 1 A pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks exists.
Proof. Notice that G satisfies (i) and (ii). Let us proceed by contradiction. Assume
that there does not exist any set of networks G ⊆ G that is pairwise farsightedly stable.
This means that for any G0 ⊆ G that satisfies (i) and (ii) in Definition 3, we can find
12There are some random dynamic models of network formation that are based on incentives to form
links such as Watts (2001), Jackson and Watts (2002), and Tercieux and Vannetelbosch (2006). These
models aim to use the random process to select from the set of pairwise stable networks. Part (ii) in
Definition 3 asks for the robustness to perturbations of the set of pairwise farsightedly networks.
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a proper subset G1 that satisfies (i) and (ii). Iterating this reasoning we can build an
infinite decreasing sequence {Gk}k≥0 of elements of G satisfying (i) and (ii). But since G
has finite cardinality, this is not possible.
In Example 1 with n = 3, B = 6, and pi(g) = (n − 1 − ni)/n, the set consisting of the
complete network is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set whatever the fine φ.
We consider first the case φ < 32 . It can be verified that F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g7},
F (g1) = {g2, g3, g7}, F (g2) = {g1, g3, g7}, F (g3) = {g1, g2, g7}, F (g4) = {g1, g2, g3, g7},
F (g5) = {g1, g2, g3, g7}, F (g6) = {g1, g2, g3, g7}, and F (g7) = ∅. Notice that the analysis of
farsightedly improving paths can be intricate. The only way to go from g1 to g2 is via g4.
At the same time it holds that g4 /∈ F (g1). Indeed, players 1 and 2 make a link to go from
g1 to the intermediate network g4 in the anticipation that player 3 will subsequently delete
his link with player 1. To go from g1 to the terminal network g4 is a strict deterioration
for players 2 and 3. The only thing player 1 can do is to sever his link with player 2, which
leads to g0. This is not helpful for player 1, since once at g0 he is still the only one that is
better oﬀ at g4 compared to g0, and there is nothing that he can do anymore.
We show next that {g7} is pairwise farsightedly stable. Since g7 ∈
T
g∈G\{g7} F (g),
Part (ii) of the definition is clearly satisfied. Moreover, Part (i) is satisfied, since any
deviation from g7 may lead back to g7. Clearly, {g7} is minimal, so Part (iii) is satisfied
too.
There are no other pairwise farsightedly stable sets. Since F (g7) = ∅, Part (ii) implies
that g7 belongs to any pairwise farsightedly stable set. Since {g7} is pairwise farsightedly
stable, using Part (iii) it follows that {g7} is the only pairwise farsightedly stable set.
We now consider the case φ ≥ 3/2. We have F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g1) =
{g4, g5, g7}, F (g2) = {g4, g6, g7}, F (g3) = {g5, g6, g7}, F (g4) = {g7}, F (g5) = {g7},
F (g6) = {g7}, and F (g7) = ∅. So, g7 ∈
T
g∈G\{g7} F (g). Since F (g7) = ∅, we can use
the same arguments as in the case φ < 3/2 and can therefore conclude that {g7} is the
unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
The next theorem provides an easy to verify condition for a set to be pairwise farsight-
edly stable.
Theorem 2 If for every g ∈ G\G we have F (g)∩G 6= ∅ and for every g0 ∈ G, F (g0)∩G =
∅, then G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proof. Part (ii) is trivially satisfied.
Suppose Part (i) is not satisfied. Then there is g0 ∈ G and a deviation to g /∈ G
such that every g00 ∈ G ∩ F (g) defeats g0. In particular, it then follows that g00 ∈ F (g0), a
10
contradiction, since by assumption there is no g00 ∈ G with that property. Consequently,
Part (i) holds.
To verify Part (iii), suppose there is a proper subset G0 of G that satisfies Parts (i)
and (ii). Let g0 be in G but not in G0. By assumption, F (g0)∩G = ∅ for every g0 ∈ G, so
F (g0) ∩G0 = ∅, and G0 violates Part (ii), leading to a contradiction. It follows that G is
minimal.
A byproduct of Example 4, to be presented later on in the paper, is that Theorem 2
cannot be extended to an “if and only if" statement. The “if and only if" statement is true,
however, when restricting the scope of the theorem to sets consisting of a single network.
Theorem 3 The set {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if for every
g0 ∈ G \ {g} we have g ∈ F (g0).
Proof. If {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set then by Part (ii) in Definition 3 it
follows that ∀g0 ∈ G \ {g} it holds g ∈ F (g0).
Now suppose that for every g0 ∈ G \ {g} we have g ∈ F (g0). Part (ii) is trivially satis-
fied. Since g ∈ F (g + ij) and g ∈ F (g − ij), Parts (ia) and (ib) hold. Finally, Part (iii)
is satisfied because {g} is a singleton.
Theorem 3 tells us that {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if there exists
a farsightedly improving path from any network leading to g. Part (iii) of the definition
implies that if {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, then g does not belong to any other
pairwise farsightedly stable set. But there may be pairwise farsightedly stable sets not
containing g.
The next result provides a full characterization for unique pairwise farsightedly stable
sets.
Theorem 4 The set G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if G =
{g ∈ G | F (g) = ∅} and for every g ∈ G \G, F (g) ∩G 6= ∅.
Proof. (⇐) Part (ii) of Definition 3 is trivially satisfied. Suppose Part (i) is not satisfied.
Then there is g0 ∈ G and a deviation to g /∈ G such that every g00 ∈ G∩F (g) defeats g0. In
particular, it then follows that g00 ∈ F (g0), a contradiction, since by assumption F (g0) = ∅.
Consequently, Part (i) holds. Since F (g) = ∅, ∀g ∈ G, by Part ii it holds that G is a
subset of any pairwise farsightedly stable set. It then follows from Part (iii) that G is the
unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(⇒) Part (ii) yields that ∀g ∈ G \ G, F (g) ∩ G 6= ∅. It remains to be shown that
F (g) = ∅, ∀g ∈ G. Suppose not, so let g∗ and g0 be such that g∗ ∈ G and g0 ∈ F (g∗).
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Consider G0 = {g0}∪ {g ∈ G | g0 /∈ F (g)}. Notice that g∗ /∈ G0 and that for any g /∈ G0 we
have that g0 ∈ F (g).
Claim: G0 satisfies Part (i) and (ii).
By construction of G0, Part (ii) is satisfied. Consider any pairwise deviation from g0
to g00 /∈ G0. By construction of G0, g0 ∈ F (g00) and the deviation is deterred. Consider any
pairwise deviation from any g0 ∈ G0\{g0} to some g00 /∈ G0. Suppose that all g ∈ F (g00)∩G0
are preferred by the players initially deviating to g0, then it follows that F (g00)∩G0 ⊆ F (g0).
By definition of G0, g0 ∈ F (g00), so g0 ∈ F (g00) ∩G0 ⊆ F (g0), contradicting g0 /∈ F (g0) for
any g0 ∈ G0 \ {g0}. Consequently, all pairwise deviations from g0 ∈ G0 \ {g0} are deterred.
Since pairwise deviations from g0 are deterred too, the set G0 satisfies Part (ii).
Finally, if G0 satisfies Part (iii), then G0 is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, a con-
tradiction to the uniqueness of G. If G0 does not satisfy Part (iii), then, following the
reasoning in the proof of Theorem 1, there is a proper subset G00 of G0 satisfying (i), (ii)
and (iii). Since g∗ ∈ G, but g∗ /∈ G00, we obtain a contradiction to the uniqueness of G.
From Theorem 4 we obtain the following corollary that provides the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions such that there is a unique pairwise farsightedly stable set consisting
of a single network.
Corollary 1 The set {g} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if for
every g0 ∈ G \ {g} we have g ∈ F (g0) and F (g) = ∅.
When we compare Corollary 1 to Theorem 3, we find that Part (ii) of Definition 3
together with F (g) = ∅ leads to uniqueness of {g} as a pairwise farsightedly stable set,
whereas Part (ii) together with a non-empty F (g) leads to the existence of at least two
pairwise farsightedly stable sets, one of which is {g}.
Example 2 Symmetric Connections Model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Players form
links with each other in order to exchange information. If player i is connected to player
j, by a path of t links, then player i receives a payoﬀ of δt from his indirect connection
with player j. It is assumed that 0 < δ < 1, and so the payoﬀ δt decreases as the path
connecting players i and j increases; thus information that travels a long distance becomes
diluted and is less valuable than information obtained from a closer neighbor. Each direct
link ij results in a cost c to both i and j. This cost can be interpreted as the time a player
must spend with another player in order to maintain a direct link. Player i’s payoﬀ from
a network g is given by
Yi(g) =
X
j 6=i
δt(ij) −
X
j:ij∈g
c,
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Figure 2: The symmetric connections model with three players.
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) =∞
if there is no path between i and j).
In Figure 2 we have depicted the 3−player case where (i) for c < δ(1−δ), the complete
network (g7 in Figure 2) is the unique pairwise stable network, (ii) for δ(1 − δ) < c < δ,
the star networks (g4, g5, g6 in Figure 2) are pairwise stable, (iii) for c > δ, the empty
network is the unique pairwise stable network.
Applying our newly defined concept of farsightedly stable sets to the symmetric con-
nections model with three players, we obtain that a network g is pairwise stable if and
only if {g} is pairwise farsightedly stable. First we consider the case c < δ(1− δ). It holds
that F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g1) = {g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g2) = {g4, g5, g6, g7},
F (g3) = {g4, g5, g6, g7}, F (g4) = {g5, g6, g7}, F (g5) = {g4, g6, g7}, F (g6) = {g4, g5, g7}, and
F (g7) = ∅. Now it follows by Corollary 1 that {g7} is the unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set.
Next we consider the case δ(1− δ) < c < δ. It holds that F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6},
F (g1) = {g4, g5, g6}, F (g2) = {g4, g5, g6}, F (g3) = {g4, g5, g6}, F (g4) = {g5, g6}, F (g5) =
{g4, g6}, F (g6) = {g4, g5}, and F (g7) = {g4, g5, g6}.
By a repeated application of Theorem 3, it follows that {g4}, {g5}, and {g6} are
pairwise farsightedly stable.
Finally, we examine the case c > δ. One may verify that F (g0) = ∅, F (g1) =
{g0}, F (g2) = {g0}, F (g3) = {g0}, F (g4) = {g0, g1, g2}, F (g5) = {g0, g1, g3}, F (g6) =
{g0, g2, g3}, and F (g7) = {g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6}. It follows by Corollary 1 that {g0} is the
unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
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Thus, Examples 1 and 2 suggest that pairwise farsighted stability may be a refinement
of pairwise stability as defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). However, the next exam-
ple shows that the pairwise stable networks may not belong to any pairwise farsightedly
stable set of networks.
Example 3 Suppose that four players can form links. In the empty network, Yi(g) = 0
for all i ∈ N . In any g such that #(g) = 1 and player 4 does not belong to N(g), we
have Y4(g) = 1. Moreover, Y1({12}) = Y3({13}) = Y2({23}) = 4, Y2({12}) = Y1({13}) =
Y3({23}) = 2, Y1({23}) = Y2({13}) = Y3({12}) = 1. In any g such that #(g) = 2 and
player 4 does not belong to N(g), we have Yi(g) = 3 for i ∈ N(g), and Y4(g) = 1. We
define Yi({12, 13, 23}) = −1 for all i ∈ N . Finally, in any other network g, let Yi(g) = 0
for all i ∈ N . Figure 3 presents most of these network configurations. In this example the
pairwise stable networks are the complete network as well as the networks such that #(g)
equals 4 or 5.
We have F (g1) = {g2, g3, g4, g5, g6}, F (g2) = {g1, g3, g4, g5, g6}, F (g3) = {g1, g2, g4, g5, g6},
F (g4) = F (g5) = F (g6) = {g1, g2, g3}, F (g7) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6} ∪ {g7 + ij | ij /∈ g7},
and F (g) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6} for any other g. The pairwise farsightedly stable sets are
{g1}, {g2}, {g3}, and {g4, g5, g6}. On the contrary, the pairwise stable networks are all
networks g with #(g) ≥ 4.
Pairwise farsighted stability is a refinement of pairwise stability when there is a unique
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Theorem 5 If G is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set and the network g belongs
to G, then g is pairwise stable.
Proof. By Theorem 4, for g ∈ G, F (g) = ∅, which implies that g is pairwise stable.
Corollary 2 If {g} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set, then g is pairwise stable.
4 Eﬃciency and farsighted stability
We now turn to the question of the relationship between farsighted stability and eﬃciency
of networks. A first result is that the set of pairwise farsightedly stable networks and the
set of strongly eﬃcient networks, those which are socially optimal, may be disjoint for all
14
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Figure 3: Pairwise farsighted stability and pairwise stability.
allocation rules that are component balanced and anonymous.13
Theorem 6 There exists a value function such that for every component balanced and
anonymous rule, strongly eﬃcient networks are not included in any of the pairwise far-
sightedly stable sets.
Proof. Take the following value function defined for any g ∈ G : v({12, 13, 23}) = 9,
v({12, 23}) = 0, v({12, 13}) = 0, v({13, 23}) = 0, v({12}) = 8, v({23}) = 8, v({13}) = 8,
and v(∅) = 0. Fix any component balanced and anonymous allocation rule Y . Then, by
component balance and anonymity,
(i) Y1({12, 13, 23}, v) = Y2({12, 13, 23}, v) = Y3({12, 13, 23}, v) = 3,
13Bhattacharya (2005) has obtained a similar result with respect to the notion of the largest consistent
set.
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(ii) Y1({12, 23}, v) = c, Y3({12, 23}, v) = c, Y2({12, 23}, v) = −2c, Y2({12, 13}, v) = c,
Y3({12, 13}, v) = c, Y1({12, 13}, v) = −2c, Y1({13, 23}, v) = c, Y2({13, 23}, v) = c,
Y3({13, 23}, v) = −2c,
(iii) Y1({12}, v) = Y2({12}, v) = 4, Y3({12}, v) = 0, Y1({13}, v) = Y3({13}, v) = 4,
Y2({13}, v) = 0, Y2({23}, v) = Y3({23}, v) = 4, Y1({23}, v) = 0, and
(iv) Y1(∅, v) = Y2(∅, v) = Y3(∅, v) = 0.
The unique strongly eﬃcient network is {12, 13, 23}. We have:
(i) F (∅) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12, 13, 23}};
(ii) F ({12}) = {{13}, {23}}, F ({13}) = {{12}, {23}}, F ({23}) = {{12}, {13}};
(iii) For c < 3, F ({12, 13}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12, 13, 23}}, for 3 ≤ c < 4, F ({12, 13}) =
{{12}, {13}, {23}}, and for c ≥ 4, F ({12, 13}) = {{12}, {13}}. Next, for c < 3,
F ({12, 23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12, 13, 23}}, for 3 ≤ c < 4, F ({12, 23}) = {{12},
{13}, {23}}, and for c ≥ 4, F ({12, 23}) = {{12}, {23}}. And, for c < 3, F ({13, 23}) =
{{12}, {13}, {23}, {12, 13, 23}}, for 3 ≤ c < 4, F ({13, 23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}}, and
for c ≥ 4, F ({13, 23}) = {{13}, {23}};
(iv) For c < 3, F ({12, 13, 23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}, {12, 13}, {12, 23}, {13, 23}}, for c ≥ 3,
F ({12, 13, 23}) = {{12}, {13}, {23}}.
Thus, {{12}}, {{13}}, and {{23}} are the only pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
A second result considers the case where there is a network that strictly Pareto domi-
nates all other networks. That is, if there is a network g such that for all g0 ∈ G \ {g} it
holds that, for all i, Yi(g, v) > Yi(g0, v). Although the network that strictly Pareto domi-
nates all others is pairwise stable, there might be many more pairwise stable networks. We
will show in Section 5 that also the concept of the pairwise largest consistent set suﬀers
from a similar defect. The following result asserts that pairwise farsighted stability singles
out the Pareto dominating network as the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Theorem 7 If there is a network g that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, then
{g} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proof. It is immediate that g ∈ F (g0) for all g0 ∈ G \ {g} and that F (g) = ∅. Corollary 1
leads to the desired result.
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We next provide suﬃcient conditions on the allocation rule and/or the value function
such that there is no conflict between strong eﬃciency and farsighted stability.
An immediate application of Theorem 7 is the case of increasing returns to link creation
as defined in Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005). This property requests that along every
nested sequence of increasingly connected networks, there is a threshold network for which
the value turns nonnegative, and both aggregate as well as payoﬀs of individuals who form
extra links then increase as the network becomes even larger. Under this condition, and
with a componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, gN Pareto dominates all other networks,
so Theorem 7 applies.
An allocation rule is said to be egalitarian if for every v ∈ V and g ∈ G, Yi(g, v) =
v(g)/n. The following result follows as a corollary to Theorem 7.
Corollary 3 Suppose that Y is the egalitarian rule and there is a unique strongly eﬃcient
network ge. Then, {ge} is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Before studying the relationship between pairwise farsightedly stable sets and other
farsighted solution concepts we analyze some classical examples.
Example 4 Co-author Model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Each player is a researcher
who spends time writing papers. If two players are connected, then they are working on
a paper together. The amount of time researcher i spends on a given project is inversely
related to the number of projects, ni, that he is involved in. Formally, player i’s payoﬀ is
given by
Yi(g) =
X
j:ij∈g
µ
1
ni
+
1
nj
+
1
ninj
¶
for ni > 0. For ni = 0 we assume that Yi(g) = 0. In Figure 4 we have depicted the
3-player case. It is easily verified that the complete network g7 is the unique pairwise
stable network.
Unfortunately, no singleton set is pairwise farsightedly stable in Example 4. Indeed,
there is no network such that there is a farsightedly improving path from any other
network leading to it. More precisely, F (g0) = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6}, F (g1) = {g4, g5},
F (g2) = {g4, g6}, F (g3) = {g5, g6}, F (g4) = {g7}, F (g5) = {g7}, F (g6) = {g7}, and
F (g7) = ∅. However, a set formed by the complete and two star networks is a pairwise
farsightedly stable set of networks. The pairwise farsightedly stable sets are {g4, g5, g7},
{g4, g6, g7}, and {g5, g6, g7} in the co-author model with three players.
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Figure 4: The co-author model with three players.
Example 5 Symmetric Connections Model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Consider again
the symmetric connections model of Example 2 but now with four players, see Figure 5. In
Figure 5 all possible networks, up to permutations of players, are depicted. For instance,
the circle network, g8, represents the four possible circle networks. As before, we assume
0 < δ < 1.
First consider the case c < δ(1− δ). In this case, irrespective of the network, making
a link always strictly improves the payoﬀs of the players involved in making the link.
From this observation it follows immediately that the complete network g10 is the unique
pairwise stable network. Moreover, from any initial network except the complete one, it
is possible to reach the complete network by a farsightedly improving path. There are no
other networks that are reached by a farsightedly improving path when starting in the
complete network. It follows from Corollary 1 that the complete network is the unique
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Next, suppose that δ(1− δ) < c < δ(1− δ2). Observe that 2(δ− c)+ δ2 strictly exceeds
3(δ− c) and δ+ δ2+ δ3− c, but is lower than δ+2δ2− c. From this observation it follows
easily that a network is pairwise stable if and only if it is one of the four stars or the four
circle networks (g6, g8 in Figure 5).
Moreover, {g6} and {g18, g28, g38, g48} are pairwise farsightedly stable sets, where {g18, g28, g38,
g48} denotes the set of all circle networks. For any star this follows from the observation
that g6 leads to the highest possible payoﬀ δ + 2δ2 − c for three out of four players. For
all networks but g7 it holds that none of the players gets this payoﬀ, so there are at least
three players that would be willing to move to g6. They can do so by first destroying all
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Figure 5: The symmetric connections model with four players.
links in an appropriate order, and next adding links to reach the specific star g6 they
coordinate on. Links have to be destroyed in such a way that on the sequence of networks
thus obtained, no player gets payoﬀ δ + 2δ2 − c. Also, any star g6 can be reached by a
farsightedly improving path starting in any of the four possible networks g7. Take a specific
star g6 and a specific network g7. If the player with payoﬀ δ + 2δ2 − c at g7 obtains less
at g6, then the other three players would strictly improve by going to g6. They can do so
by destroying all links, and then add links to reach the desired star g6. If the player with
payoﬀ δ + 2δ2 − c at g7 obtains the same payoﬀ at g6, then there are two players that are
strictly better oﬀ at g6. Together they can destroy at least two links of g7, in which case a
network with only one link remains, and all players would be willing to move from there
to g6. Finally, it is possible to reach any star from another, diﬀerent, star, by means of a
farsightedly improving path. The player with three links is willing to destroy all of them
and move to g0, from which any star can be reached by adding the appropriate three links.
It therefore follows from Theorem 3 that {g6} is pairwise farsightedly stable.
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It is fairly straightforward that any circle g8 belongs to F (g) whenever g is not equal
to g6 or g7. For g6 notice that the player with payoﬀ 3(δ − c) may first delete all links to
go to g0, after which three links are added and any g8 is reached via g1, g2, and g4. For
g7 the player with payoﬀ 3(δ − c) can sever three links to go to g1, after which one more
link is deleted by any of the players involved in the remaining link, to go to g0. Next links
are added to reach g8 in the same way as before. Since all the circles lead to identical
payoﬀs, it is not possible to reach a circle from a diﬀerent circle by means of a farsightedly
improving path. It follows from Definition 3 that {g18, g28, g38, g48} is pairwise farsightedly
stable.
The next case is δ(1−δ2) < c < δ. For this case it is crucial that 3(δ−c) < 2(δ−c)+δ2 <
δ+δ2+δ3−c < δ+2δ2−c. It is straightforward to verify that any of the six pairs of chains
{g12344 , g13244 }, {g12434 , g14234 }, {g13424 , g14324 }, {g21344 , g23144 }, {g21434 , g24134 }, {g31244 , g32144 }, and
any of the four stars (g6 in Figure 5) is pairwise stable. Here, the notation for the chains
refers to the links that are present. For instance, g12344 denotes the chain with links {1, 2},
{2, 3}, and {3, 4}. Notice that the payoﬀs are the same for all players for any two chains
in any of the six pairs.
That any star {g6} is pairwise farsightedly stable follows from exactly the same argu-
ment as in the case δ(1 − δ) < c < δ(1 − δ2). Now consider a specific chain g4. For all
networks, but g4, g6, and g7, the two players in g4 with payoﬀs δ + δ2 + δ3 − c are willing
to destroy their links to arrive at g1. Then the remaining link at g1 is severed too and g0
is reached. From there, players can add links to go to g4. Next consider a specific star g6
as the starting network. The player with payoﬀ 3(δ − c) is sure to receive higher payoﬀs
in g4. He is willing to destroy all links, and g4 is reached via g0. For g7 the construction
is similar, and g4 can be reached via g1 and g0. Consider two chains that do no belong to
the same pair. There is at least one player that receives payoﬀ 2(δ − c) + δ2 in one chain,
but not in the other. This player is willing to delete a link to go to either g2 or g3. From
there it is possible to reach the other chain via g0. Obviously, it is not possible to reach
the other chain in a pair. It follows from Definition 3 that any pair of chains identified
before is pairwise farsightedly stable.
The next case we consider is δ+ 12δ
2 < c.We observe that any payoﬀ that is a positive
multiple of δ−c is negative (and the higher the multiple, the more negative). Moreover, the
payoﬀ 2(δ−c)+δ2 is negative. Finally, δ+δ2+δ3−c > δ+δ2−c > 2(δ−c)+δ2 > 2(δ−c).
Next it is easy to verify that in each network but the empty network there is always at least
one player that strictly benefits from deleting a link. It follows that the empty network is
the only potential pairwise stable network. Since forming a link leads to negative utilities
for the players making the link, it follows that the empty network is the unique pairwise
20
stable network.
Now we turn to pairwise farsighted stability. It is easily verified that for each network,
but g0, the set of players with negative payoﬀs are able to delete all links. It follows that
g0 ∈ F (g) for all g ∈ G \ {g0}. Now consider g0 as the starting network. For all other
networks, there is at least one player with a link that has a negative payoﬀ. Such a player
will never cooperate to make the network under consideration the terminal network, and
as a consequence F (g0) = ∅. We derive from Corollary 1 that {g0} is the unique pairwise
farsightedly stable set.
The final case we have to consider is δ < c < δ+ 12δ
2. As in the previous case, it holds
that any payoﬀ that is a positive multiple of δ− c is negative, and the higher the multiple,
the more negative. Moreover, it holds that 0 < 2(δ− c)+ δ2 < δ+ δ2− c < δ+ δ2+ δ3− c.
It is easy to verify that g0 is the unique pairwise stable network. However, a pairwise
farsightedly stable set that is singleton fails to exist. Indeed, there is no network such
that there is a farsightedly improving path from any other network leading to it. The
empty network {g0} is not a pairwise farsightedly stable set because obviously g0 /∈ F (g4)
and g0 /∈ F (g8). On the contrary, using by now familiar arguments, it can be shown that
any of the six pairs of chains {g12344 , g13244 }, {g12434 , g14234 }, {g13424 , g14324 }, {g21344 , g23144 },
{g21434 , g24134 }, {g31244 , g32144 } is pairwise farsightedly stable.
5 The pairwise largest consistent set
In this section we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and the
largest consistent set, a concept that has been defined in Chwe (1994) for general social
environments. By considering a network as a social environment, and by allowing only
pairwise deviations, we obtain the definition of the pairwise largest consistent set.
Definition 4 Let Z0 ≡ G. Then, Zk (k = 1, 2, . . .) is inductively defined as follows:
g ∈ Zk−1 belongs to Zk with respect to Y and v if
(ia) ∀ ij /∈ g, ∃ g0 ∈ Zk−1, where g0 = g+ ij or g0 ∈ F (g+ ij) such that Yi(g0, v) < Yi(g, v)
or Yj(g0, v) < Yj(g, v) or (Yi(g0, v), Yj(g0, v)) = (Yi(g, v), Yj(g, v)).
(ib) ∀ ij ∈ g, ∃ g0, g00 ∈ Zk−1, where g0 = g − ij or g0 ∈ F (g − ij), and g00 = g − ij or
g00 ∈ F (g − ij), such that Yi(g0, v) ≤ Yi(g, v) and Yj(g00, v) ≤ Yj(g, v).
The pairwise largest consistent set PLCS (G) is
T
k≥1 Zk.
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That is, a network g ∈ Zk−1 is stable (at step k) and belongs to Zk, if all possible
pairwise deviations are deterred. Consider a pairwise deviation from g that involves mak-
ing the link ij. There might be further pairwise deviations which end up at g0, where
g + ij → g0. If either i or j is worse oﬀ at g0 or both are equally well oﬀ compared to the
original network g then the pairwise deviation is deterred. Similarly, for a pairwise devia-
tion from g that involves deleting the link ij. There might be further pairwise deviations
which end up at g0 and g00 where g− ij → g0 and g− ij → g00. If i is equally well or worse
oﬀ at g0 and j is equally well or worse oﬀ at g00 compared to the original network g, then
the pairwise deviation is deterred.
Since G is finite, there exists m ∈ N such that Zk = Zk+1 for all k ≥ m, and Zm is
the pairwise largest consistent set PLCS (G). Notice that although the pairwise largest
consistent set always exists, it could be empty. However, it has been shown in Chwe (1994)
that for the case of a finite G non-emptiness holds.
Example 4 (continued) We determine the pairwise largest consistent set in the co-author
model for n = 3. Starting in g0, players {1, 2} can add a link to move to g1. The indirect
dominance relation implies that from there it is possible to reach g4 or g5. In all these
networks, players 1 and 2 have higher payoﬀs than at g0. It follows that g0 /∈ Z1. Starting
in g4, players 2 and 3 will add a link to move to g7. Since F (g7) = ∅, no further moves will
occur. Players 2 and 3 have higher payoﬀs at g7 than at g4. It follows that g4 /∈ Z1. For
similar reasons, g5 /∈ Z1 and g6 /∈ Z1. It can be verified that Z1 = {g1, g2, g3, g7}.
We show next that Z2 = {g1, g2, g3, g7}. Starting in g1, players 1 and 2 may add a link
to go to g4, a network not in Z1. From g4 the indirect dominance relation dictates a move
to g7. In g7 player 1 is worse oﬀ than in g1. It follows that no link will be added by them to
g1. Repeating such arguments, it can be shown that Z2 = {g1, g2, g3, g7} = Z3 = · · · = Z∞.
It follows that PLCS(G) = {g1, g2, g3, g7}.
Example 3 (continued) We determine the pairwise largest consistent set in the four-player
link formation game. One can easily show that Z1 = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6} ∪ {g | #(g) ≥
4} = Z2 = Z3 = · · · = Z∞.
Table 1 summarizes our findings in these two examples.
If a network is not in the pairwise largest consistent set, it cannot be a pairwise
farsightedly stable set of networks.
Theorem 8 If {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set, then g belongs to the pairwise
largest consistent set PLCS (G).
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Concept Example 3 Example 4
Pairwise stability {g | #(g) ≥ 4} {g7}
Pairwise farsightedly
stable sets of networks
{g1}, {g2}, {g3}
{g4, g5, g6}
{g4, g5, g7}, {g4, g6, g7},
{g5, g6, g7}
PLCS
{g1, . . . , g6}
∪{g | #(g) ≥ 4}
{g1, g2, g3, g7}
Table 1: The (no)-relationships among solution concepts for network stability.
Proof. Since {g} is a pairwise farsightedly stable set we have that for all ij /∈ g : g ∈
F (g + ij) and for all ij ∈ g : g ∈ F (g − ij). So g ∈ Z1. By induction, g ∈ Zk for k ≥ 1.
So, g ∈ PLCS(G).
Remember that two networks g and g0 are adjacent if they diﬀer by one link. The
value function v and allocation rule Y exhibit no indiﬀerence if for any g and g0 that are
adjacent either g defeats g0 or g0 defeats g.
Theorem 9 Suppose that Y and v exhibit no indiﬀerence. If g is pairwise stable then it
belongs to the pairwise largest consistent set.
Proof. Since Y and v exhibit no indiﬀerence, we have that a pairwise stable network g
defeats (i) g + ij for all ij /∈ g and (ii) g − ij for all ij ∈ g. Thus, g ∈ F (g + ij) and
g ∈ F (g − ij). So g ∈ Z1. By induction g ∈ Zk for k ≥ 1. So, g ∈ PLCS(G).
We claimed in Section 4 that even if there is a network that strictly Pareto dominates
all other networks, the pairwise largest consistent set may contain other networks. It is not
diﬃcult to construct examples where the no indiﬀerence property holds, and some network
strictly Pareto dominates all others. Moreover, such an example can be constructed such
that ineﬃcient networks may be pairwise stable. It then follows from Theorem 9 that such
a network also belongs the pairwise largest consistent set. By virtue of Theorem 7, such
a network does not belong to any pairwise farsightedly stable set.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, to predict which
networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairwise far-
sightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G to a network
outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse oﬀ or equally well oﬀ, (ii) if there
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exists a farsightedly improving path from any network outside the set leading to some
network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying (i) and (ii). We
have shown that a pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a full
characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. As a corollary
we have given the necessary and suﬃcient condition such that a unique pairwise farsight-
edly stable set consisting of a single network exists. We have found that the pairwise
farsightedly stable sets and the set of strongly eﬃcient networks may be disjoint. Never-
theless, contrary to other pairwise concepts, if there is a network that Pareto dominates all
other networks, then that network is the unique prediction of pairwise farsighted stability.
We have also been able to provide some conditions on the allocation rule and the value
function such that pairwise farsighted stability singles out the strongly eﬃcient network.
Finally, we have studied the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other
concepts such as pairwise stability and the pairwise largest consistent set, a notion due to
Chwe (1994). Under some conditions, a pairwise farsightedly stable set is a refinement of
pairwise stability, which in turn is a refinement of the pairwise largest consistent set. By
means of examples we have shown that there is no general relationship between (i) pair-
wise farsightedly stable sets and pairwise largest consistent sets, (ii) pairwise farsightedly
stable sets and pairwise stability. Indeed, the pairwise stable networks may not belong to
any pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.
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